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This  paper  is  the  first  comprehensive  critical  analysis  of  the  empirical  studies 
of  transfers  in  Japan,  an  area  of  research  which  dates  only  from  1986.l  The 
three  articles  I  examine  are:  Hayashi’s  (1986)  “Why  is  Japan’s  Saving  Rate  So 
Apparently  High.  ,  3”  Hayashi,  Ando,  and  Ferris’s  (December  1988)  “Life  Cycle  and 
Bequest  Savings”,  and  Dekle’s  (1989)  “The  U nimportance  of  Intergenerational 
Transfers  in  Japan.”  The  first  article,  which  covers  the  1969-74  period,  is  the 
most  careful  published  attempt  to  date  to  quantify  the  amount  of intergenerational 
transfers  in  Japan,  The  second  is  a  preliminary  attempt  to  estimate  the  flow  of 
transfer  wealth  in  1984  in  the  household  sector  in  Japan.  The  third  study  measures 
the  amounts  of  intergenerational  transfers  received  over  the  1968-83  period  by  the 
40-44,  45-49,  50-54,  and  55-59  generations  which  head  all  worker  households  (two- 
or-more  person  nuclear,  extended,  and  other  families)  in  1983. 
In  Section  2  I  elucidate  the  Modigliani  and  Kotlikoff  and  Summers  definitions 
of  transfer  wealth.  This  is  a  necessary  introduction  to  Section  3  which  looks  at 
the  definitions  of  transfer  wealth  actually  used  by  the  authors  above.  Sections  4 
and  5  present  analyses  of  their  estimation  of  respectively  accumulated  wealth  and 
life  cycle  saving. 2 
2. DEFINITIONAL  ISSUES 
Recently  there  has  been  a lively  controversy  in  the  literature  over  exactly  what 
is  the  appropriate  definition  of  transfers  (Cf.,  Kotlikoff  (1988),  Modigliani  (1986, 
1988)  and  Kotlikoff  and  Summers  (1981,  1986)).  In  this  section  I  clearly  delineate 
and  compare  the  contrasting  views  of  Modigliani  and  Kotlikoff  and  Summers. 
The  Kotlikoff-Summers  definition  is  particularly  straightforward  from  a  con- 
ceptual  standpoint.  K-S  define  all  net  gifts  received  by  the  individual  as  transfers. 
In  addition  all  of  the  nominal  return  attributable  to  gifts  is  included  in  the  trans- 
fer  wealth  of  the  individual.  In  the  aggregate  transfer  transactions  among  living 
individuals  cancel  out;  the  stock  of  aggregate  transfer  wealth  is  then  the  amount 
of  net  transfers  received  from  those  dead  by  those  still  living,  accumulated  at  the 
rates  of  total  nominal  return  (nominal  rent  plus  nominal  capital  gains  of  assets). 
The  Modigliani  definition  uses  a  more  complicated  conceptual  framework.  It 
draws  a  distinction  between  gifts  received  that  are  used  to  support  current  con- 
sumption  and  gifts  received  that  are  saved.  The  former  is  not  counted  as  a  trans- 
fer,  the  latter  is.  Transfer  wealth  for  an  individual  is  the  sum  of  all  net  transfers 
received  adjusted  for  inflation,  i.e.,  the  real  value  of  transfers  is  maintained.  In 
the  aggregate,  as  in  the  K-S  case,  transfer  transactions  among  living  individuals 
cancel  out; 
from  those 
the  stock  of  aggregate  transfer  wealth  is  then  the  total  of  net  transfers 
dead  to  those  still  living,  accumulated  at  the  inflation  rates  (inflation 
rates  here  are  broadly  based  measures  of  inflation  such  as  the  CPI). 
These  definitions  are  made  mat hemat  ically  precise  in  the  equations  that  follow. 
Assuming  that  income  is received  and  consumption  occurs  at  the  beginning  of each 3 
period,  then  under  the  K-S  definition  aggregate  life-cycle  wealth  from  the  start 
of  period  t  to  the  start  of  period  t+s  is: 
t+s  t+s-1 
LCWt,t+s  =  C(k;  -  Ci)  n  (1 +  4  (1) 
i=t  k=i 
Yi is  the  aggregate  after-tax  labor  income  plus  government  transfers  in  period  i of 
those  still  living  at  the  start  of  period  t+s,  C;  is  their  aggregate  consumption  in 
period  i,  rk  is  the  rate  of  nominal  return  and  flizty’,_,(  1 -I- r’k) and  nf,“=“,,‘,(  1-k rk) 
are  defined  respectively  to  be  1 +  rt++l  and  1.  The  K-S  definition  of  aggregate 
transfer  wealth  from  t  to  t+s  is: 
t+s  t+s-1 
TW,t+s  =  C(T,i +  Ts,)  n (1 + ‘k)*  (2) 
i=t  k=i 
where  Tci  is  net  aggregate  transfers  used  for  consumption  in  period  i  received  by 
those  still  living  at  the  start  of  period  t+s  from  those  who  died  during  the  interval. 
T,,  is  defined  identically  except  that  these  transfers  were  saved. 
Note  that  TWt,t+s  can  also  be  computed  alternatively  by  using  the  following 
formula. 
t+s-1 
TWt,t+s  =  At+s  -  At-1  rI(  1  +  rk)  -  LCWt,t+s.  (3) 
k=t-1 
where  At+S  and  At-1  represent  the  aggregate  wealth  of  the  household  sector  in 
periods  t+s  and  t-l. 
Using  the  same  notation  as  above  it  is  easy  to  write  down  the  analogous 
Modigliani  expressions. 
t+s  t+s-1 
TW,t+s  =  CTs,  n  (l+xk).  (4) 
i=t  k=i 4 
t+s  t+s-I 
LCW,t+s  =  x(X-Ci+TCi)  jJ  (l+rk) 
i=t  k=i 
t+s  t+s-1  t+s-1 
+xT,,(  n (l+rk)-  n (l+“k))*  (5) 
i=t  k=i  k=i 
By  comparing  (1)  and  (5)  and  (2)  and  (4)  we  see  that  the  definitions  are 
the  same  when  both  T,,  and  rk  minus  Xk  are  zero  for  all  periods.  The  stock  of 
transfer  wealth  under  the  Modigliani  definition  can  be  larger  or  smaller  than  the 
stock  under  the  K-S  definition  depending  on  the  values  of  Tci,  Ts,, rk, and  nk  over 
the  sample  period.  An  increase  in  T,,  for  one  or  more  periods  will  increase  the 
stock  of  transfer  wealth  under  the  K-S  definition  but  leaves  the  Modigliani  stock 
unchanged.  The  same  experiment  for  T,,  leads  to  increases  in  both  stocks;  the 
increase  in  the  K-S  stock  will  be  larger  than  the  increase  in  the  Modigliani  stock 
when  the  relevant  streams  of  accumulated  nominal  return  (the  fl(l  +  rk)  terms 
involved)  are  all  larger  than  the  corresponding  streams  of  accumulated  inflation. 
This  holds  in  general  when  rl;  minus  7rk is  positive  over  the  entire  sample  period. 
When  the  length  of  the  sample  period  is increased  it  is impossible  to  infer  anything 
a  priori  about  the  absolute  magnitudes  of  the  stocks  or  their  relative  magnitudes 
vis-a-vis  the  stock  of  total  assets  without  making  steady  state  assumptions.  Note 
in  particular  that  as  s  changes  even  the  original  sample  period  values  of  Yi,  Ci, 
Tsi, and  Tci change  since  the  relevant  population  has  changed. 
Finally  I  note  that  there  is  no  consensus  in  the  literature  that  on  theoretical 
grounds  the  K-S  definition  is  preferable  to  the  Modigliani  definition  or  vice- 
versa  (Cf.,  Kessler  and  Masson  (1989)).  Of  course  none  of  this  would  make  any 
difference  if  as  an  applied  matter  the  results  came  out  largely  the  same  under  the 
two  definitions.  As  Modigliani  (1986,  1988)  h as  shown  there  is  little  reason  to 
believe  this  is  the  case  however.  Considering  this,  I  will  employ  both  definitions 5 
throughout  this  paper. 
Above  I presented  in  general  terms  two  definitions  of  aggregate  transfer  wealth 
and  noted  they  represented  different  measures  of  the  total  of  accumulated  net 
transfers  received  by  those  still  living  from  those  who  died  during  the  sample 
period.  Below  I  further  refine  these  definitions  by  noting  the  conventions  that 
have  been  adopted  vis-a-vis  transfers  within  the  family. 
Two  conventions  have  been  adopted  on  intrafamily  transfers.  First,  in  a  very 
widely  accepted  practice,  accumulated  interspousal  transfers  are  excluded  from  in- 
tergenerational  transfers.  2 To  be  more  precise  under  both  the  K-S  and  Modigliani 
definitions  when  a  spouse  dies  all  accumulated  interspousal  transfers  (including 
bequests)  from  the  decedent  regardless  of  the  date  of  receipt  and  regardless  of 
how  the  transfers  were  used  are  considered  part  of  the  life-cycle  wealth  of  the  re- 
maining  spouse.  These  interspousal  transfers  are  capitalized  at  the  relevant  rates 
of  nominal  return. 
The  second  convention  also  widely  accepted  (Cf.,  footnote  2)  is  that  consump- 
tion  expenditures  of  minor  children  are  classified  as  consumption  expenditures  of 
their  parents  rather  than  as  transfers.  When  a  parent  dies  bequests  to  minor  chil- 
dren  are  of  course  considered  transfers.  The  only  difference  between  Modigliani 
and  K-S  in  this  regard  is  that  the  rates  of  capitalization  of  this  part  of  trans- 
fer  wealth  are  respectively  the  appropriate  inflation  rates  and  the  corresponding 
rates  of  nominal  return.  If  at  the  time  of  the  death  of  the  parent  the  children 
are  adults,  the  above  analysis  holds  for  those  transfers  received  while  the  children 
were  minors;  transfers  received  by  the  children  from  the  decedent  after  reaching 
adulthood  are  treated  in  the  standard  fashion  under  the  two  definitions. 6 
3. DEFINITIONS  OF  TRANSFER  WEALTH 
I  turn  first  to  the  basic  definition  of  transfer  wealth  (Hayashi  (1986),  p.  188, 
equation  8)  that  Hayashi  used.  s  I  abstract  here  from  his  adjustments  for  capital 
gains/losses  and  for  what  he  terms  “underreporting.”  In  particular  this  means 
that  the  inflation  rate  for  a year  is equal  to  the  weighted  average  across  assets  of the 
rates  of  nominal  capital  gains.  I  show  below  that  the  definition  of  transfer  stock 
he  uses  is not  one  of  the  standard  definitions  and  that  compared  to  the  Modigliani 
definition  it  may  represent  a  substantial  underestimation  or  overestimation  of  the 
stock  of  transfer  wealth.  Further,  Hayashi  presents  no  theoretical  justification  for 
the  definition  he  uses. 
Hayashi  defines  life-cycle  saving  to  equal  disposable  income  minus  consump- 
tion.  Life-cycle  saving  for  a  cohort  over  a  period  equals  all  nominal  rent  in  that 
period  plus  after-tax  labor  income  plus  government  transfers  minus  consumption 
plus  net  gifts  received  that  are  used  for  current  consumption.  Note  that  net  gifts 
received  that  are  saved  are  not  counted  as  saving  though  the  nominal  rent  from 
these  gifts  is.  In  the  Hayashi  calculation  the  stock  of  transfers  for  a 
year  is  equal  to  year-end  wealth  minus  the  life-cycle  saving  for  the 
initial  wealth  revalued  at  year-end  prices.  In  equations  we  can  write: 
cohort  in  a 
year  minus 
W&ear 
Sl(life  - 
-  end  wealth)  =WO(  1 +  7-l +  7~)  +  T,,(  1 +  5  +  %, 
+  (Yl  -  Cl  +  T&(1  +  ;  +  7). 
cycle  saving)  =Wo(v)  +  z@ 
+  pi  -  Cl  +  Z,)(l  +  ;,. 
(6) 
(7) 7 
Transfers  =Wl  -  WI-J(~ +  7rl)  -  S1 
=Z,(l  +  3)  +  (Yl  -  Cl  +  z-&)($). 
Ii  -  S  definition  of  transfers  :(T,,  +  T,,)(l  +  :  +  :).  (9) 
Modigliani  definition  :T,, (1  +  7) 
where  IV0  equals  initial  wealth,  rl  is  nominal  rent  and  ~1  is  the  weighted  average 
across  assets  of  the  rates  of  nominal  capital  gains  (and  is  equal  to  the  overall 
inflation  rate). 
Hayashi’s  stock  of  transfer  wealth  (equation  8)  is  the  amount  of  net  gifts 
received  that  were  saved  plus  the  nominal  capital  gains  attributable  to  these  gifts 
plus  the  nominal  capital  gains  accruing  from  Yl  -  Cl  +  T,,.  This  definition  is 
obviously  different  from  the  standard  definitions  listed  in  equation  9.  Comparing 
the  Hayashi  definition  to  the  Modigliani  definition,  we  see  that  to  the  extent  that 
nominal  capital  gains  (losses)  on  Yl  -  Cl  +  T,,  were  high,  the  Hayashi  measure 
will  be  greater  than  (or  less  than)  the  Modigliani  measure.  In  the  limiting  case 
in  which  there  was  no  inflation  (no  nominal  capital  gains),  the  two  measures 
are  equal.  However,  in  the  1969-74  period  inflation  was  very  high  (Cf.,  Hayashi, 
Table  Al,  column  PCON),  and  no  doubt  the  Hayashi  figures  are  very  substantially 
biased. 
I look  now  at  the  definitions  of transfer  wealth  for  a cohort  that  Hayashi,  Ando, 
and  Ferris  (December  1988)  employed.  4 The  change  in  wealth  equals  all  nominal 
rent  and  all  nominal  capital  gains  earned  in  the  period  plus  transfers  received  that 
were  saved  plus  transfers  received  that  were  consumed  plus  after-tax  labor  income 8 
plus  government  transfers  minus  consumption.  The  authors’  standard  measure  of 
saving  equals  all  nominal  rent  earned  in  the  period  (including  nominal  rent  on 
transfers  received)  plus  after-tax  labor  income  plus  government  transfers  minus 
consumption.  In  equations  we  have: 
W(aJ)  -  W(u  -  1,t  -  1) =  W(u  -  1,t  -  l)(r1  +  7rl) 
+  (Z,  +  G,)(l  +  ;  +  2) 
+  (Yl  -  C1>(1+  7  +  3).  ’ 
s*  =  W(u  -  1,t  -  l)rr  +  (T,,  +  T,,); 
+  (K  -  Cl>(l  +  5). 
Subtracting  equation  11  from  equation  10: 
AW-  S*  =  (W(u-  l,t-  I)+ 
T,,  +  z,  +  X  -  Cl 




where  rl  represents  the  rate  of  nominal  rent  and  nl  is  the  rate  of  nominal  capital 
gains  on  assets.  Hence  the  change  in  wealth  minus  saving  equals  nominal  capital 
gains  earned  in  the  period  plus  tmnsfers  received. 
The  alternate  measure  of  saving,  S”,  is: 
S’  =  S*+expected  nominal  capital  gains  on  land 
and  stocks  -  capital  losses  due  to  inflation  (13) 
where  expected  nominal  capital  gains  on  land  and  stocks  equals  eight  percent  of 
their  year-end  value  and  capital  losses  due  to  inflation  equals  the  inflation  rate 9 
times  year-end  total  wealth.  Therefore: 
AW  -  S**  =  AW  -  S’  -  (expected  nominal  capital  gains  on  land 
and  stocks  -  capital  losses  due  to  inflation)  (14) 
The  Modigliani  and  Kotlikoff-Summers  definitions  of  transfer  wealth  in  this 
case  are: 
Pb) 
where  rr is  the  conventional  inflation  rate. 
Subtracting  (15a)  from  (12)  we  have: 
(AW  -  S*)-(T,,  +  T,,)(l+  5  +  ?)  = 
(W(a  -  1,  t -  1) +  ’  i  ‘l)v  -  (T,,  +  T,,);.  (16) 
Hence  the  authors’  standard  measure  of  transfers  can  be  either  greater  than  or  less 
than  the  K-S  measure.  In  particular  to  the  extent  that  the  rate  of  nominal  gains 
on  assets  (x1)  is  high,  the  authors’  measure  will  overestimate  the  K-S  measure. 
In  recent  years,  though  not  in  1984,  ~1  has  been  very  high.  Further  to  the  extent 
that  transfers  in  a  year  are  small  relative  to  initial  wealth  at  the  beginning  of  the 
year,  the  authors’  measure  again  will  overestimate  the  K-S  measure. 
The  same  exercise  for  the  authors’  second  definition  of  transfers  only  entails 
subtracting  off  from  the  RHS  of  (16)  expected  real  capital  gains.  These  in  1984 
were  positive  and  hence  the  authors’  second  measure  of  transfers  (14)  is  always 10 
less  than  their  first  (12).  A s  in  the  first  case  the  second  measure  may  be  less 
than  or  greater  than  the  Kotlikoff-Summers  measure  and  the  ~1  analysis  above 
also  holds  here.  Also  as  inflation  increases  the  second  measure  again  tends  to 
overestimate  the  Kotlikoff-Summers  measure. 
Summing  up,  we  see  that  the  two  definitions  proposed  by  the  authors  differ 
from  those  conventionally  used.  And  Hayashi  et  al.  do  not  seriously  argue  why 
their  definitions  are  to  be  preferred.  In  addition  I  note  that  their  definitions 
are  not  intergenerational  as  usually  defined  since  interspousal  transfers  are  not 
subtracted  off  (Cf.,  Section  2). 
Finally  since  Dekle  (1989)  d oes  not  precisely  define  life  cycle  saving,  it  is 
impossible  to  evaluate  his  definition  of  transfers,  though  it  is  clearly  modeled  on 
the  Kotlikoff-Summers  definition. 
4. ESTIMATION  OF ACCUMULATED  WEALTH 
I first  examine  Hayashi’s  (1986)  estimation  of  wealth.  In  order  to  calculate  the 
flow  of  transfers  Hayashi  estimated  the  initial  and  final  per-household  wealth  of 
families  that  were  nuclear  in  1974.  I show  below  that  his  intergenerational  transfer 
figure  is  extremely  sensitive  to  error  in  his  wealth  calculations.  I  then  catalogue 
the  reasons  why  it  is  likely  that  these  errors  are  of  substantial  magnitude. 
In  Table  1  I  have  attempted  to  duplicate  Hayashi’s  calculations  for  1974  (fig- 
ures  for  extended  families  of  the  25  to  39  age  bracket  are  not  presented  because 
Hayashi  combined  this  category  with  older  extended  families).  Hayashi  does  not 
detail  his  calculation  method.  We  do  know  though  that  for  each  age  group  and 
for  each  type  of  family  he  estimated  an  imputed  rent-food  expenditure  ratio.  He 11 
Table  1 
Age  Profile  of  Income,  Imputed  Rent,  and 
Food  Expenditure  by  Family  Type, 
Worker  Households,  1974 
25-29  30-34 
Age  in  1969 
35-39  40-44  45-49 
Panel  A,  Nuclear 
1  .Number  of  households  2.2  2.1  1.8  1.5  .9 
2.Total  assets  2,480,OOO  3,048,OOO  3,770,ooo  4,732,OOO  5,237,OOO 
3.Net  financial  assets  689,247  808,879  1,193,305  1,684,955  2,065,174 
4.Tangible  assets  1,790,753  2,239,121  2,576,695  3,047,045  3,171,826 
5.Imputed  rent  89,538  111,956  128,835  152,352  158,591 
6.Food  expenditure  532,860  588,600  624,600  622,344  567,504 
7.Imp.  rent/Food  exp.  .168  .190  .206  .245  .279 
Panel  B,  Extended 
l.Number  of  households  -  -  .4 
2.Total  assets  -  -  6,750,OOO 
3.Net  financial  assets  -  2,117,159 
4.Tangible  assets  -  4,632,841 
5.Imputed  rent  -  -  231,642 
6.Food  expenditure  -  667,068 
7.Imp.rent/Food  exp.  -  .347 








Sources:  Hayashi’s  Table  9;  1974  National  Survey,  v.  1, Table  21  and  v.  7, 
Table  4. 12 
then  multiplied  this  ratio  times  yearly  food  expenditures  for  each  group  to  get 
each  group’s  yearly  imputed  rent.  Next  he  assumed  that  nominal  returns  on  tan- 
gible  assets  in  1974  was  five  percent.  5 This  permitted  him  to  calculate  the  total 
of  tangible  assets  for  each  group.  Net  financial  assets  are  given  directly  in  the 
National  Survey  (National  Survey  of Family  Income  and  Expenditure) 
tables.  The  total  of  tangible  and  net  financial  assets  is  total  assets.  Since  he  did 
not  list  his  imputed  rent-food  expenditure  ratios,  I  generated  the  implicit  figures 
by  working  backward  from  total  assets.  \ 
As  an  illustration  of  how  sensitive  Hayashi’s  transfer  calculation  is  to  error 
in  the  wealth  figures,  let  us  suppose  that  he  overestimated  by  five  percent  (.05 
versus  the  true  figure  of  .04762)  the  nominal  return  on  real  assets  in  1974.  Or 
equivalently  we  could  suppose  that  the  true  imputed  rent-food  expenditure  ratios 
in  1974  were  five  percent  higher  than  those  actually  used.  Then  tangible  assets 
in  1974  will  of  course  be  five  percent  higher,  and  total  assets  turn  out  to  be  3.24 
percent  higher.  Hence  1974  wealth  of  the  groups  he  looked  at  would  increase  from 
78 to  80.53  trillion  yen  and  transfers  would  increase  from  8  to  10.53  trillion  yen, 
an  increase  of  32  percent.6 
Are  errors  of  the  magnitude  described  above  likely?  The  easiest  way  to  look 
at  this  is  to  consider  in  turn  the  three  distinct  kinds  of  wealth  computations  he 
undertakes:  one,  the  wealth  in  1974  of  nuclear  families  in  the  targeted  age  group, 
two,  the  initial  wealth  of  families  that  were  nuclear  in  1969  and  remained  nuclear 
through  1974,  and,  three,  the  initial  wealth  of  families  that  were  extended  in  1969 
and  became  nuclear  by  1974. 
For  the  category  1  calculation  likely  sources  of  error  are  the  nominal  rate  of 
return  on  tangible  assets  in  1974  and  the  1974  imputed  rent-food  expenditure 13 
ratios.  Hayashi’s  estimate  of  the  nominal  return  on  real  assets  may  or  may  not  be 
correct:  no  such  information  is  given  in  the  National  Surveys,  and  I  did  not  try 
to  corroborate  Hayashi’s  figure.  For  the  imputed  rent-food  expenditure  ratios, 
the  key  problem  is  that  ratios  are  not  broken  down  by  both  age  of  the  household 
and  family  type  in  the  Surveys.  However  they  are  broken  down  separately  by 
each  category.  Since  there  are  ten  age  categories  and  three  family  type  categories 
(nuclear,  extended  and  other),  this  in  effect  gives  us  thirty  unknowns  and  thirteen 
equations.  Th e  underidentification  problem  cannot  be  resolved.  Indeed  even  if 
all  cell  values  were  zero  except  for  nuclear  and  extended  families  of  the  35-49  age 
bracket,  this  would  still  leave  us  with  six  unknowns  and  five  equations.  Therefore 
we  can  be  confident  that  there  is  some  imprecision  in  Hayashi’s  estimates  of  these 
ratios,  though  it  is  impossible  to  quantify  how  much. 
For  the  category  2  calculation,  in  addition  to  the  sources  of  error  indicated 
above,  there  is  also  the  problem  that  Hayashi  assumes  that  the  per-household 
wealth  in  1969  of  all  nuclear  families  of  the  same  age  bracket  is  the  same  in  spite 
of  the  fact  that  these  families  can  be  divided  into  two  distinct  groups:  those 
who  remained  nuclear  through  1974  and  those  who  formed  extended  families  by 
1974  (Cf.,  see  my  related  comments  in  Section  5).  It  is  likely  that  the  economic 
characteristics  of  these  two  groups  are  somewhat  different,  and  hence  Hayashi  has 
certainly  introduced  a  degree  of  bias  in  his  calculation.  Recall  that  even  if  this 
difference  is  not  large  in  percentage  terms  it  may  profoundly  affect  the  size  of  the 
stock  of  transfer  wealth.7 
The  calculations  for  the  category  3  group  -  those  younger  generation  house- 
holds  that  were  extended  in  1969  and  became  nuclear  by  1974  -  are  the  most 
problematic.  Indeed  I  think  it  is  fair  to  say  that  they  are  entirely  unreliable. 14 
Hayashi’s  procedure  was  to  assume  that  the  1969  wealth  held  by  the  elderly  in 
extended  families  headed  by  those  in  the  25  to  29  age  bracket  was  equal  to  the 
difference  between  the  wealth  held  by  these  extended  families  and  the  wealth  held 
by  25-29  year-old  nuclear  families.  Wealth  of  the  elderly  in  older  extended  fami- 
lies  was  computed  by  discounting  the  wealth  of  the  dependent  elderly  above  by  a 
productivity  factor  of  five  percent  per  one-year  age  difference.  Finally  the  wealth 
of  the  dependent  elderly  in  each  age  bracket  was  subtracted  from  the  wealth  of  the 
corresponding  extended  families  to  arrive  at  the  wealth  of  the  youngergenerations 
in  these  families. 
I  think  it  is  reasonable  to  believe  that  the  wealth  held  by  the  young  in  the  25 
to  29  age  bracket  in  1969  was  quite  uniform  across  family  status  (i.e.,  nuclear- 
nuclear,  nuclear-extended,  extended-extended,  and  extended-nuclear).  Hence 
Hayashi’s  initial  calculation  was  acceptable  subject  to  the  reservations  detailed 
in  my  category  1  discussion  above.  However  his  imputation  of  the  wealth  of 
the  older  elderly  is  entirely  an  ad-hoc  procedure.  It  depends  on  the  assumption 
of  drastic  stationary  conditions  which  simply  were  not  satisfied  in  the  post-war 
period  in  Japan.  For  a  lucid  but  rather  too  abbreviated  analysis  of  this  issue  see 
Ando  (1985,  Chapter  V).  In  the  absence  of  any  justification  of  this  procedure,  it 
is  impossible  to  have  any  confidence  in  his  estimates  of  the  wealth  of  the  older 
elderly.  Further  even  if  these  estimates  were  not  open  to  question,  Hayashi  does 
not  distinguish  the  behavior  of  the  35  to  49  younger  generation  who  switched  from 
extended  to  nuclear  over  the  period  from  the  behavior  of  those  in  this  age  category 
who  remained  extended  over  the  period.  Unlike  the  25  to  29  case,  we  can  expect 
substantial  differentiation  in  1969  wealth  holdings  for  these  groups.  In  brief  I  see 
few  redeeming  features  in  his  treatment  of  category  3  wealth  estimation. 15 
Next  I  analyze  the  accumulated  wealth  calculations  undertaken  by  Hayashi, 
Ando,  and  Ferris  (December  1988).  I  restrict  my  comments  to  their  cohort  effect 
computations;  the  sum  of  the  cohort  effect  and  the  cross-sectional  growth  rate 
equals  the  longitudinal  growth  rate.  I  start  with  the  young  nuclear  group.  The 
cohort  effect  here  is  defined  as: 
W(u  -  1,t)  -  W(u -  1,t  -  1).  (17) 
Note  that  the  first  term  represents  the  log  of  the  average  per-household  wealth 
\ 
in  t  of  those  young  nuclear  households  in  the  five-year  age  bracket  a-i in  t  and 
the  second  term  is  the  log  of  the  average  per-household  wealth  in  t-l  of  those 
households  that  become  young  nuclear  households  in  t and  that  are  in  the  five-year 
age  bracket  a-l  in  t-l. 
The  authors  make  a  series  of  very  strong  assumptions  that  are  not  very  pre- 
cisely  stated  in  order  to  attach  a  number  to  the  cohort  effect.  These  assumptions 
appear  to  be  the  following: 
1.  The  economy  is  in  a  steady  state. 
2.  Therefore  the  cohort  effect  for  all  young  equals  the  productivity  rate. 
3.  It  might  well  be  the  case  that  for  certain  subsets  of  the  young  the  cohort 
effect  does  not  equal  the  productivity  rate. 
4.  However  the  incomes  of  extended  and  nuclear  young  in  1984  were  the  same 
so  we  can  conclude  the  cohort  effects  of  the  two  groups  were  the  same. 
5.  Hence  we  can  use  the  productivity  rate  as  the  cohort  effect  for  nuclear 
young. 
Even  accepting  statements  1 to  4  above,  5  would  follow  only  if  the  young  in  these 
age  brackets  were  comprised  solely  of  young  nuclear  and  young  extended.  In  fact, 16 
a large  number  of  households  were  dropped  from  the  original  sample.  The  authors 
are  then  implicitly  assuming  that  the  cohort  effect  of  the  omitted  young  equals 
the  cohort  effect  of  the  other  two  groups. 
In  addition  to  this  point,  I  note  that: 
1.  The  Japanese  economy  is  not  in  a  steady  state  now  (and  was  not  in  1984) 
though  many  economists  seem  to  believe  that  Japan  is  converging  to  a  steady 
state.  In  a  transition  period  the  behavior  of  economic  agents  is  not  going  to  be 
consistent  with  steady  state  behavior  because  their  past  (pre-transition  state) 
behavior  was  not  consistent  with  steady  state  behavior.  One  can  imagine  for 
instance  the  effects  a  halving  of  the  real  growth  rate  over  the  past  fifteen  years 
have  had  on  saving  and  consumption  of  the  middle  aged  in  Japan. 
2.  It  seems  a  heroic  assumption  to  posit  that  the  cohort  effects  of  the  nuclear 
young  and  the  extended  young  in  1984  were  the  same  simply  because  their  income 
in  that  year  was  the  same. 
3.  Even  if  one  is  willing  to  ignore  the  above  reservations,  there  still  remains 
the  problem  of  attaching  a  number  to  the  cohort  effect.  Presumably  even  if  an 
economy  can  be  approximated  by  a  steady  state,  as  a  practical  matter  there  is 
going  to  be  some  variation  in  productivity  rates.  To  the  extent  that  the  numbers 
jump  around  a  lot,  picking  an  appropriate  productivity  rate  would  seem  to  be 
difficult.  The  authors  are  careful  to  acknowledge  this  point. 
I turn  now  to  the  cohort  effect  calculation  done  by  the  authors  for  the  elderly  in 
extended  families.  Nearly  the  identical  procedure  was  used  to  compute  the  cohort 
effect  of  the  independent  elderly;  therefore  the  force  of my  comments  below  applies 
to  that  case  as  well. 
The  authors  use  an  approximation  to  the  following  equation  to  calculate  the 17 
cohort  effect: 
W(u  -  1,t)  -  W(u  -  1,t  -  1)  = 
-(logPl(a$)  -  logPl(a  -  1,t)) 
244  -  po(a  -  I) 
(18) 
where  in  this  case  W(a-1,t)  is  the  log  of  the  average  household  wealth  in  t  held 
by  the  elderly  in  extended  families  whose  children  in  t  are  in  the  five-year  age 
bracket  a-l,  W(a-l,t-1)  is  the  log  of  the  average  household  wealth  in  t-l  of  the 
elderly  who  are  in  extended  families  in  t  and  whose  children  in  t  are  in  age  bracket 
a,  logPI(a,t)  is  the  log  of  the  permanent  income  of  the  elderly  in  the  second  group, 
and  logPI(a-1,t)  is the  log  of  the  permanent  income  of the  elderly  in  the  first  group. 
As  pa(a)  -  pa(a-1)  (the  difference  in  the  mean  ages  of  the  two  groups)  approaches 
1  we  have: 
W(u  -  1,t) 
Pl(u-  1,t)  = 
where  here  W  and  PI  are  not  in  logs.  The  LHS  of  (19)  is  the  wealth-PI  ratio 
in  t  of  the  first  group  of  elderly,  and  the  RHS  is  the  wealth-PI  ratio  in  t-l  of  the 
W(u -  1,t  -  1) 
Pl(u  -  1, t  -  1)  (19) 
second  group  of  elderly. 
This  “elasticity  of  wealth  with  respect  to  permanent  income”  of  course  need 
not  be  one  for  any  a  let  alone  all  a,  as  the  authors  observe  in  footnote  11.  Further 
no  empirical  evidence  is  presented  to  substantiate  their  assumption.  Therefore 
their  analysis  of  the  cohort  effect  for  the  elderly  living  in  extended  families  should 
simply  be  dismissed  as  unsupported. 
Even  if  one  accepted  (19),  one  problem  remains  -  the  unreliability  of  their 
estimates  of  permanent  income  which  they  define  to  be  the  sum  of  pension  and 
business  income.  The  authors  are  aware  of  this  issue  and  in  effect  concede  that 
these  estimates  are  merely  suggestive.8 18 
I  conclude  that  the  methodology  used  to  compute  cohort  effects  is  intrinsically 
flawed.  Hence  the  estimates  of  the  cohort  effects  are  merely  speculative.  This 
also  means  of  course  that  the  stock-based  longitudinal  growth  rate  estimates  are 
entirely  unreliable. 
Dekle’s  (1989)  t  es  imation  of  the  wealth  accumulated  over  the  1968-83  period 
by  four  cohorts  is  marred  by  several  defects.  First  in  his  estimation  of  final 
wealth,  he  assigns  to  the  target  generations  the  entire  wealth  of  the  households 
that  they  head.  This  means,  most  notably,  that  the  wealth  of  the  elderly  living  in 
extended  families  headed  by  the  target  generations  is  improperly  allotted  to  the 
younger  generation.  Turning  to  his  estimates  of  initial  wealth,  he  takes  the  initial 
wealth  of  the  target  generations  to  be  the  1968  wealth  of  all  worker  households 
in  which  the  heads  are  25-29,  30-34,  35-39,  and  40-44.  There  are  two  glaring 
errors  here.  First  households  are  excluded  that  should  be  included  and  vice- 
versa.  To  take  a  concrete  example,  for  his  cohort  1  (households  aged  25-29  in 
1968  and  40-44  in  1983),  he  excludes  the  large  number  of  25-29  year-olds  who 
were  unmarried,  living  with  their  parents  in  1968,  and  not  the  heads  of  their 
households  but  who  in  1983  were  living  in  nuclear  households  (for  a  detailed 
discussion  of  the  changes  over  time  in  family  composition  of  selected  cohorts  see 
Campbell  (1991),  Chapter  3,  Section  2).  Second,  echoing  a  comment  above,  even 
for  those  households  that  were  properly  included,  he  assigns  the  entire  household 
wealth  to  the  target  generations,  setting  equal  to  zero  the  wealth  holdings  of  other 
adult  generations  in  the  household. 
Abstracting  from  the  above,  it  is  apparent  that  Dekle’s  calculation  of  the 
value  of  residential  land  held  by  homeowning  households  headed  by  the  target 
generations  is  in  error.  Dekle  claims  that  for  these  households  the  value  of  resi- 19 
dential  land  is  the  same  across  cohorts  and  is  equal  to  the  average  value  of  newly 
acquired  lots.  The  available  evidence  (see  Campbell  (1991),  Appendix  1,  fn.  13) 
indicates  that  for  homeowning  two  or  more  person  all  households  (i.e.,  worker  and 
nonworker  households  comprised  of  extended,  nuclear,  and  other  families),  the 
value  of  owned  residential  land  increases  with  the  age  of  the  cohort,  that  these 
differentials  are  significant,  and  that  they  are  driven  almost  exclusively  by  differ- 
ences  in  the  amounts  of  residential  land  owned  by  the  cohorts.  These  conclusions 
most  likely  apply  to  worker  households,  the  sample  Dekle  investigated.  Hence 
Dekle’s  contention  that  for  these  households,  the  value  of  owned  residential  land 
is  the  same  across  cohorts  is  almost  certainly  wrong,  a  point  that  he  concedes. 
Particularly  given  this,  it  seems  one  would  be  compelled  to  explain  where  the 
average  value  of  newly  acquired  lots  stands  in  the  distribution  across  cohorts  of 
the  value  of  residential  land  held  by  homeowning  households  headed  by  the  target 
generations.  However  Dekle  is  silent  on  this  subject.  It  strongly  appears  then 
that  Dekle’s  calculation  of  the  value  of  residential  land  is  gravely  flawed.  This 
suggests  that  his  overall  wealth  calculations  are  suspect  given  the  importance  of 
residential  land  in  household  portfolios. 
In  summary  then  his  failures  in  his  estimation  of  wealth  to  distinguish  cohorts 
from  synthetic  cohorts  and  the  target  generations  from  their  households  with 
the  difficulties  he  encountered  in  computing  the  value  of  residential  land  held 
by  homeowning  households  in  all  likelihood  means  that  his  estimates  suffer  from 
major  biases. 20 
5. ESTIMATION  OF  LIFE  CYCLE  SAVING 
I  discuss  first  the  derivation  of  the  unadjusted  life  cycle  saving  figures  in 
Hayashi  (1986).  Hayashi  makes  three  assumptions  about  saving  behavior: 
1.  Everyone  of  the  same  age  bracket  in  nuclear  (as  defined  by  Hayashi)  house- 
holds  in  1969  saved  the  same  amount  in  1969.  And  all  of  the  young  of  that  age 
bracket  in  extended  households  in  1969  saved  the  same  amount.  ’ 
2.  The  per-household  saving  of  the  two  groups  in  (1)  was  the  same  in  1969. 
3.  Further  the  per-household  saving  of  all  those  in  the  indicated  age  bracket 
remained  the  same  in  real  terms  over  the  five  year  period. 
The  three  assumptions  taken  together  imply  that  all  the  young  of  the  same  age 
bracket  -  whether  in  extended  families  or  not  in  1969  and  regardless  of  whether 
they  changed  their  family  status  over  the  period  -  saved  the  same  amount  per 
household  in  real  terms  over  the  five  year  period. 
Obviously  the  easiest  way  to  check  if  this  implication  is  correct  is  to  compare 
the  per-household  saving  of  nuclear  families  in  1969  and  1974  by  age  bracket. 
These  figures  in  1974  yen  are  listed  in  Table  2  (computed  directly  from  Hayashi’s 
Table  9).  From  the  table  it  is  clear  that  Hayashi’s  assumptions,  taken  at  face 
value,  are  not  supported  by  the  evidence.  This  does  not  mean  of  course  that 
his  estimate  of  life-cycle  saving  is  necessarily  wrong.  It  could  be  the  case,  for 
instance,  that  all  the  young  of  a  certain  age  bracket  saved  the  same  amount  in 
any  year,  but  that  this  amount  varied  across  year.  If  so,  the  1969  saving  figures 
could  represent  the  five-year  average,  and  hence  his  estimate  of  life-cycle  saving 
would  be  unbiased. 21 
Table  2 
Per-household  Saving  in  1969  and  1974  by  Age  Bracket, 
Nuclear  Families,  Worker  Households 
1969  Savings 
1974  Savings 





Age  in  1969 
40-44  45-49 
347  357 
596  663 
72  86 22 
More  realistically  the  actual  saving  behavior  Hayashi  was  interested  in  proba- 
bly  cannot  be  characterized  so fortuitously.  Over  the  period  the  young  of  a certain 
age  bracket  under  Hayashi’s  categorization  can  be  divided  into  four  groups: 
u)  Those  who  were  in  nuclear  families  in  1969  and  stayed  in  nuclear  families  over 
the  five  years. 
b)  Those  who  were  in  nuclear  families  in  1969  and  switched  to  extended  by  1974. 
c)  Those  who  were  in extended  families  in  1969  and  remained  in  extended  families 
through  1974. 
d)  Those  who  were  in  extended  families  in  1969  and  formed  nuclear  families  by 
1974. 
It  is likely  that  the  amount  saved  per  household  varied  both  across  the  four  groups 
(a,  b,  c,  and  d)  and  across  time.  Hence  Hayashi  should  have  tried  to  isolate  the 
saving  behavior  of  groups  a  and  d  across  time.  This  would  have  been  no  simple 
matter.  In  particular  a  key  point  would  be  trying  to  estimate  the  amount  saved 
per  household  by  those  in  group  d  in  1969.  This  is  especially  difficult  since  in  the 
extended  family  category  in  1969  there  are  not  only  type  c  and  type  d  nuclear 
families  but  also  as  well  the  parents  of  both  groups.  And  the  National  Survey 
data,  in  tabulated  form  at  least,  does  not  provide  a  comprehensive  breakdown  of 
income  and  consumption  by  family  member. 
In  this  situation  it  seems  clear  that  the  way  to  proceed  would  be  to  posit  a base- 
line  figure  for  the  type  d  per-household  saving  amount  in  1969  (and  hence  posit 
an  implicit  saving  amount  for  their  parents),  and  then  run  simulations  around 
the  baseline.  This  is  an  essential  step  since  the  saving  behavior  of  the  dependent 
elderly  is  so  little  understood.  If  that  were  done,  reasonable  saving  profiles  for 23 
group  d  over  the  entire  period  could  be  established.  And  a  related  exercise  could 
be  done  for  group  a. 
With  the  above  in  mind  it  is  impossible  at  this  stage  to  state  definitively  the 
amount  of  bias  that  Hayashi  has  introduced  into  his  calculations  by  his  oversim- 
plification  of  this  problem.  It  seems  logical  to  believe  however  that  the  amount 
of  bias  introduced  by  assumption  3  swamps  the  amount  of  bias  attributable  to 
his  first  two  assumptions.  In  short  his  assumption  of  constant  real  saving  over 
a  period  in  which  both  saving  rates  and  real  income  were  increasing  ‘probably 
means  that  on  the  whole  he  significantly  underestimated  the  life-cycle  savings  of 
the  groups  under  investigation. 
Turning  to  Hayashi,  Ando,  and  Ferris  (December  1988),  if  one  abstracts  from 
definitional  problems  (Cf.,  Section  3),  their  estimation  of  life  cycle  saving  for 
nuclear  and  extended  households  seems  basically  robust.  An  important  reason 
for  this  is  that  since  the  time  horizon  for  their  study  was  only  one  year,  they 
had  largely  complete  longitudinal  saving  data  (but  not  longitudinal  wealth  data, 
see  Section  4).  In  contrast,  the  Hayashi  (1986)  and  Dekle  (1989)  studies  with 
much  longer  time  horizons  (five  and  fifteen  years  respectively)  did  not  have  any 
longitudinal  data  available  and  hence  had  to  estimate  life  cycle  saving  indirectly. 
Dekle’s  (1989)  t  es  imation  of  the  life  cycle  savings  over  the  1968-83  period 
of  the  target  generations  which  head  all  worker  households  in  1983  suffers  from 
largely  the  same  drawbacks  as  his  estimation  of  their  accumulated  wealth.  Hence 
here  I  only  note  that  he  measured  the  life  cycle  savings  of  the  synthetic  cohorts 
instead  of estimating  the  savings  of  the  actual  cohorts,  and  he  attributed  the  entire 
life  cycle  saving  of  the  households  he  looked  at  to  the  target  generations,  in  effect 
assuming  that  the  life  cycle  saving  of  other  adult  generations  in  these  households 24 
(largely  the  parents  of  the  target  generations)  was  zero.  In  regard  to  the  second 
point,  the  shape  of  the  age-wealth  profile  of  the  elderly  in  extended  families  who 
are  not  the  heads  of  their  households  and  the  extent  of  their  life  cycle  saving  are 
issues  of much  controversy  that  remain  unresolved  in  the  literature  (Cf.,  Campbell 
(1991),  Chapter  2,  Section  2.5). 25 
NOTES 
1.  However  Horioka  (1990),  an  excellent  survey  on  Japanese  saving,  does 
examine  briefly  this  material. 
2.  See,  for  instance,  Modigliani  (1986,  1988),  K-S  (1981,  1986)  and  Dekle 
(1989)  and  th e  references  they  cite. 
3.  Z”,  and  T,,  are  as  defined  in  Section  2:  T,,  represents  net  non‘-capitalized 
transfers  in  current  prices  that  were  received  in  year  i and  were  used  for  consump- 
tion;  T,,  is  defined  identically  except  that  these  transfers  were  saved. 
4.  Actually  I  compare  the  change  in  wealth  with  the  two  measures  of  saving 
they  used.  The  authors  compared  the  change  in  logs  of  wealth  with  their  two 
measures  of  saving  divided  by  end  of  period  wealth. 
5.  An  examination  of  Hayashi’s  Table  5B  and  Table  6  of  volume  1  of  the 
1974  National  Survey  verifies  this. 
6.  A  similar  exercise  was  not  done  for  initial  wealth  held  by  families  that 
were  nuclear  in  1974  because  both  the  nominal  rate  of  return  on  tangible  assets 
in  1969  and  the  deflator  used  by  Hayashi  could  not  with  absolute  certainty  be 
verified.  However  it  is  obvious  that  since  the  initial  stock  is  less  than  the  final 
stock,  the  effect  described  in  the  text  will  be  less  dramatic.  In  addition  to  the 
extent  that  tangible  assets  in  1969  comprised  a  smaller  percentage  of  total  assets 
than  in  1974,  the  effect  again  will  be  reduced.  Nevertheless  even  in  this  case  it  is 
likely  that  the  sensitivity  of  the  transfer  stock  to  errors  in  initial  wealth  is  very 
substantial. 
7.  See  footnote  6. 
8.  Hayashi  et  al.,  page  469  and  pages  488-90;  in  particular  note  the  last  few 
lines  of  page  488. 26 
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